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COMMENTS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-
LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES
The case of Lanza v. New York State joint Legislative Committee, 3 N.Y.
2d 92, 164 N.Y.S. 2d 9 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. - (1957), presented the
question of whether or not a joint legislative committee ' could be restrained
from making public a tape recording and transcript of the supposedly private
consultation between attorney and client in a local county jail. The client had
been arrested as a parole violator.' While in the local jail, he was permitted
to confer with his lawyer. The room, unknown to the lawyer or the prisoner,
was wired by prison officials to record conversations. In some manner, the
Committee obtained the recording and made transcripts therefrom. It proposed
to make the transcripts public,3 the contents of such transcripts being concededly
within the scope of the Committee's inquiry. The client and his lawyer brought
an action to enjoin the Committee. The Supreme Court, special term,' held
that making the tape recording public would be a violation of the attorney-client
privilege and granted an injunction restraining publication. On appeal the
appellate division agreed that the wiring of the consultation room and the re-
cording of conversations between an attorney and client were unlawful intru-
sions into the attorney-client relationship and subject to certain sanctions and
penalties existing under appropriate provisions of law, but held that this would
not prevent the use of the products of such intrusions before an appropriate
forum by third parties who may have obtained such tape recordings or tran-
scripts. Ten days later, and less than a month after the original complaint had
been made, the case came before the Court of Appeals of New York. It was
necessary to determine whether or not the complaint stated a cause of action for
1 The exceedingly broad powers of the New York Joint Legislative Committee on Government
Operations, duly created in 1955 by the Legislature of the State of New York, can be found in the
N.Y. Legislative Index (1955, p. 664). Essentially, the Committee was created to investigate and
examine the management of any state department, board, bureau, commissioner or other agency.
2 Client in this case: Joseph "Socks" Lanza of New York racketeering fame. A racketeer with
reputedly good political connections, Lanza was known for many years as the Czar of the Fulton
Fish Market. He was accused of exacting tribute from business concerns and labor unions doing
business there. For a biographical sketch, see N.Y. Times, April 6, 1957, p. 12, col. 3.
3 An announcement appeared in the newspapers on April 26, 1957, to the effect that the Com-
mittee would hold public hearings beginning on April 29, in the course of which it would make
public a certain recording of conversations between Consentino and his client, Lanza, which had
come into its possession.
4 5 Misc. 2d 324, 164 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1957).
5 3 App. Div. 2d 531, 162 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1957).
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a restraining injunction. The court, by a four to three decision,' held that it
did not.
The first question considered by Judge Froessel in the majority opinion was
the plaintiff's contention that the use and divulgence of the recording in question
would violate the privilege between attorney and client afforded by the provi-
sions of the New York Civil Practice Act.' In putting aside this argument the
majority construed the statute as affording merely a privilege against testimonial
compulsion.' The majority also held that the statute does not forbid disclosures
by third persons overhearing the conversations between attorney and client."
In summarizing his answer to the plaintiff's contention Judge Froessel stated:
"It follows that when neither the attorney nor the client is examined as a
witness, the statute does not create a right to prevent the disclosure of confiden-
tial communication, and accordingly does not authorize a cause of action for an
injunction."
The second question considered was the plaintiff's contention that the use
and divulgence of the recording impaired the client's constitutional right to
counsel.'" The sanctity of the constitutional right of an accused to consult
privately with counsel is generally recognized and zealously enforced by state
as well as federal courts. 1  In Coplon v. United States 12 it was held that an
interception of telephone messages between the defendant and counsel, before
and during the trial, violated the constitutional right to effective aid of counsel.
The right to have the effectice assistance of counsel includes the right to com-
municate and consult freely with him at all stages of the proceedings, even
before trial has commenced and after it has been completed." This right is
6 Justices Desmond, Dye, and Fuld dissented in separate opinions in which each concurred.
7 Section 353 provides that an attorney (and his employees) "shall not be allowed to disclose
a communication, made by his. client to him, or his advice given thereon, in the course of his pro-
fessional employment." NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ACT § 353.
8 Section 354 provides: "The last three sections shall apply to any examination of a person as
a witness unless the provisions thereof are expressly waived . NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ACT
§ 354.
9 Judge Fuld in his dissenting opinion noted that this was not the simple case of a third
party eavesdropping. "This is a case where the state, or one of its subdivisions, actually in-
vited an attorney into a room so that he and his client might carry on their confidential busi-
ness in private . . . and recorded what was said . . .". Judge Dye also noted a dissimilarity
in this case from other third party interception cases in that here involved was (1) an electronic
device carefully concealed in violation of law and (2) the sanctity of a counsel chamber dur-
ing an interview between attorney and client. See also, UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, rule 26,
which brings within the sweep of the attorney-client privilege, the testimony of any witness
disclosing a communication between attorney and client if it came to the knowledge of such
witness in a manner not reasonably to be anticipated by the client.
10 N.Y. CONSr. art. I, § 6, provides, "'. . and in any trial in any court whatever the
party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel . . .".
"1See Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
926 (1952); Ex parte Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920).
12 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cerl. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
"3State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla. Crim. 94, 130 Pac. 962 (1913); Thomas v.
Mills, 117 Ohio St. 114, 157 N.E. 488 (1927).
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protected even more vigorously when the accused is confined in a jail or other
place of detention.'
The New York courts are in accord with these principles concerning the
constitutional right to counsel,15 and the majority in this case frankly admitted
that the secret recording of the conversations was an unreasonable interference
with Lanza's right to confer privately with counsel. They decided, however,
that the act of recording was not in issue in the case as presented. The use of
the recording was sought to be enjoined. Thus, the decision of the majority
was that the conduct of the prison authorities in recording the conversations
was unlawful as depriving Lanza of his constitutional right to counsel, but the
publication of the transcript of the recordings by the Committee was a separate
transaction, disconnected from the original wrongful recording.
This reasoning is much like the argument often used to justify the admis-
sion of illegally obtained evidence. Under common law admissibility of evi-
dence is not affected by the illegality of the means of obtaining it.' The
person wronged has his remedy against the trespasser, but this is no reason, so
the classical argument goes, to exclude the evidence when relevant. In a
majority of the states the common law doctrine is still applicable. It applies
even where the evidence is obtained in violation of constitutional prohibitions. 7
New York has followed the majority view in this respect and claims one of the
most famous cases representing that view. In that case, People v. Defore,8
Justice Cardozo held that evidence obtained in an illegal search of a man's
house without a warrant was admissible.
Deciding that illegally obtained evidence is admissible, however, does not
solve this problem. Some illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible on other
grounds. The admission itself, apart from the illegal procurement, may be
unlawful. In addition to the violation of personal rights in its procurement,,
there may be a violation of personal rights in its use."8 This brings us to the
important question in issue: Should the publication of the recording, disregard-
ing the manner in which it has been obtained, be restrained?
14See Young v. Coleman, 5 F.Supp. 702, (S.D. Ida. 1934); Ex parte Rider, 50 Cal. App.
797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920).
15 People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d 356 (1944).
10 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
178 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
18 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
19 Judge Fuld, dissenting: "In other cases that have arisen, the evidence was potentially
admissible; it could have been obtained properly by means of a search warrant or by means
of an order permitting interception of telephonic communications. That is not true of the
evidence with which we are concerned; here, a search warrant could not possibly have been
procured to obtain such evidence . . ."
1958.)
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In favor of a positive answer to this question it can be argued that publica-
tion itself would violate Lanza's constitutional right to the effective assistance
of counsel. It may be true that the Committee was already in possession of the
confidential information at the time of the complaint, but this does not exclude
the possibility that further harm could come to the plaintiff by its circulation.
As was said in Glasser v. United States: 2 "The right to have the assistance of
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Lanza at the
time of the interception was charged with being a parole violator." It could
not be said with certainty what prejudice could come to him as a result of
the publication of his confidential talks with his lawyer. Furthermore, such a
publication would discourage the communications of confidences to attorneys
by those inside a prison. The operation of our traditional system of trial and
appeal in criminal cases would be impaired if lawyer-client interviews in jails
would be deprived of absolute privacy. Absolute privacy in these interviews is
a privilege encompassed by the right to counsel. The cause of action against
those unlawfully acquiring the information may not be sufficient to guard the
privilege. The temptation to obtain such crucial information in an illegal man-
ner will remain as long as the information will be useful. Only when there
will be no profit by the wrong, will that wrong be repressed.
In favor of a negative answer to the question an analogy can be.drawn
to those cases in which a denial of a request by a defendant to consult with
counsel has been held constitutional where no substantial prejudice is shown.
In Altmayer v. Sanford 22 it was held that since no showing was made that the
appellant was not permitted to consult with his counsel sufficiently to prepare
his defense, he was not deprived of his right to counsel even though he could
not confer with counsel at the particular time desired. In another case 23 it was
held that a refusal to permit counsel for the accused to talk to the accused out
20 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
21Judge Fuld, dissenting: "The client was then actually under investigation by parole au-
thorities, if not by other agencies, and, accordingly, the intrusion upon the conference, sup-
posedly private and secret, constitutes the interference and invasion of a person's right to
counsel which the courts have always condemned." It is interesting to note at this point that
the court assumed Lanza's right to counsel in this case even though there is some doubt as to
whether Lanza, in jail awaiting a determination on a charge of violation of parole, was entitled
to counsel under the Correction Law of New York. Sections 216 and 217 of that law provide
for retaking a paroled prisoner when his parole officer has reasonable cause to believe that
the prisoner has violated his parole. Section 218 provides that the board shall declare the
prisoner delinquent and subsequently hold a parole court to consider the case, at which the
prisoner "shall be given an opportunity to appear personally, but not through counsel or
others, before such board of parole and explain the charges made against him." N.Y. CORREC-
TION LAW, §§ 216, 217, 218.
22 148 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1945). During a courts-martial the civilian lawyer was absent
although the appointed counsel was there.
23 Sims v. State, 194 Ark. 702, 109 S.W.2d 668 (1937).
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of the presence of the sheriff during the course of the trial was not an error
where no prejudice was shown to have resulted. If the right to counsel is not
violated in the absence of a showing of substantial prejudice when consultation
or consultation in privacy is forbidden, would the right to counsel in the absence
of a showing of substantial prejudice be violated when the consultation is pub-
lished? The court of appeals pointed out that the recording was not to be used
in connection with a proceeding directed against Lanza and that if such had
been the case, any resulting determination would be annulled by the courts on
the ground that the interference with his right to counsel had destroyed his
constitutional right to a fair trial. 4
In this case the defendant Committee was investigating the parole board
at the time of litigation. It is difficult to see just what benefit could come from
publishing the conversations." However, considering the party involved, an
investigating committee of the legislature, it cannot be assumed that the purpose
was futile. " The power of inquiry and accompanying discretion in methods
used are essential auxiliaries of the legislative function."7 The state courts quite
generally have held that the power to legislate carries with it, by necessary
implication, ample authority to obtain information needed in the rightful exer-
cise of that power.28 Proceeding upon the same argument, the majority relied
upon Hearst v. Black." In that case a Senate committee had obtained physical
possession of copies of telegrams which had been taken illegally from a tele-
graph company's offices. It was sought to restrain the committee from keeping
the messages or making any use of them. The court reasoned that Congress is
as much the guardian of the liberties and welfare of the people as the courts,
2 4 Fusco v. Moses, 304 N.Y. 424, 107 N.E.2d 581 (1952). Presence of an informer
when defendants consulted counsel deprived them of their full right to be represented by
counsel and was the basis for an annulment of a determination resulting from an administra-
tive hearing, regardless of whether the defendants were prejudiced thereby.
25 Judge Desmond, dissenting: "The only proper and legal purpose of legislative in-
vestigations is to gather facts in aid of future legislation. If there is anything in this eaves-
dropped conversation which can aid the legislature in performing its legislative functions, the
members of this Committee, having already read this transcript, can form conclusions and trans-
mit them to the legislature."
26 In regard to the possible utility of the publication of the conversations, perhaps the
Committee's purpose was to expose certain corrupt practices which had been charged to the
parole board. Since last March, they have been trying to find out if a "political fix" was re-
sponsible for the dismissal of a parole violation charge against Lanza on February 19. Lanza
was rearrested afterward and found guilty as a parole violator. The Committee has not yet
published the conversations, but the New York Times reports that in the conversation, Mr.
Consentino (the attorney involved) related to Lanza that he had seen "the little fella" and that
that "the little fella" had seen "the man with the glasses." It has been suggested that "the
man with the glasses" refers to a member of the parole board. N.Y. Times, November 13,
1957, p. 1, col. 1.
27 In re Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Educational System of State of New
York, 285 N.Y. 1, 32 N.E.2d 769 (1941).2 8 Burnham v. Morrisey, 80 Mass. 226 (1859); Falvey v. Massing, 7 Wis. 630 (1858).
29 87 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
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and in this view, "the assumption may properly be indulged that, attention
being called to the unlawful nature of the search, the Senate will not use its
proceeds in disregard of appellant's rights."
Perhaps the question is best answered by balancing the prejudice that would
or could come to the plaintiff against the need for, or utility of, publication.
Even the constitutional right to counsel must yield to the rule of reason applied
by the court in the light of the existing circumstances. ° In Barsky v. United
States "' the court stated:
"None of the fundamental rights is absolute; the public interest may
under some circumstances outweigh even the right to life itself."
The last statement presents one final question. Who shall determine what
is public interest and when it outweighs the need for protection of a funda-
mental right? More specifically, if the court had decided that the publication
of the recording should be restrained because the encroachment upon Lanza's
constitutional right, i.e., his right to counsel, outweighed the need for, or utility
of, the publication, could it restrain by injunction a legislative investigation
because the methods used infringed upon the constitutional rights of an indi-
vidual ?
It is quite consistently held that injunctions may be obtained against
members of the executive branch of government to prevent encroachment upon
the constitutional right to counsel.3 - McGrain v. Daugherty " is the leading
case concerning judicial restraint of legislative investigation. In that case the
validity of a subpoena served upon the president of a bank was questioned.
Although the necessity for ample authority to obtain information in the exercise
of the legislative process was recognized, the court did not find that the Con-
stitution had granted Congress an unfettered power of investigation. But
where the bounds of power are not exceeded, the court cannot interfere. In
Burnham v. Morrisey " the highest court of Massachusetts stated:
"The house of representatives is not the final judge of its own powers
and privileges in cases in which rights and liberties of the subject are con-
cerned; but the legality of its action may be examined and determined by
this court."
30 Cf. United States ex rel. Cooper v. Denno, 221 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 968 (1955). An officer was stationed in the court room a few feet from the counsel
table where it was possible for him to hear the attorney-client conversations. In affirming con-
viction the court held that the right of privacy of lawyer-client communications must be bal-
anced against reasonable security measures. "Such rights are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Each must yield to the rule of reason. In case of actual or possible conflict, the rule is to be
applied by the court in the light of the existing circumstances."
31 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
32Young v. Coleman, 5 F.Supp. 702 (S.D. Ida. 1934); State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9
Okla. Crim. 94, 130 Pac. 962 (1913); Thomas v. Mills, 117 Ohio St. 114, 157 N.E. 488
(1927).
33273 U.S. 135 (1927).
a480 Mass. 226 (1859).
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Many state courts have held that the keeping of officers and agencies of
the state within lawful bounds does not constitute an undue restraint upon
proper state action.3" This is especially true when constitutional rights of indi-
viduals are involved.3 However, the majority pointed to the view taken by
the federal courts in past decisions on this question. In Barsky v. United
States " the court stated:
"The courts have no authority to speak or act upon the conduct by the
legislative branch of its own business so long as the bounds of power and per-
tinency are not exceeded and the mere possibility that the power of inquiry
may be abused affords no ground for denying the power." 31
The dissenting justices took the approach that no person is beyond the law,
especially when constitutional rights are impaired.
Perhaps the answer to this question also lies in the balance of the possi-
bility of harm to the individual's rights against the public need. The problem
should probably be approached with a strong presumption of legitimacy work-
ing in favor of the legislative committee making the investigation. On the one
side is the social need that all facts be available for consideration. On the other,
the social need that fundamental liberties should not be disregarded. In case
of conflict in these considerations the courts can only apply the rule of reason
to the particular circumstances of the case. In the case at hand the plaintiff
was not being prosecuted for any serious crime. He was merely in jail awaiting
a determination on a charge of violation of parole. His right to counsel was at
least questionable.3 9  On the other hand, the investigating committee was
apparently trying to put before the people of the State of New York the facts
concerning the operation of their parole board. Approaching the case with a
strong presumption of legitimacy working in favor of the legislative committee,
it is submitted that the result reached is justified.
SHERWOOD L. YERGEY.
35 Eleuteri v. Richman, 43 N.J. Super. 303, 128 A.2d 743 (1956); Schwing v. Miles, 367
Ill. 436, 11 N.E.2d 944 (1937).
3 State Road Dept. of Florida v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So.2d 868 (1941).
'17 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
38 McGeary, Congressional Investigations: Historical Development, 18 U. CHI. L. REV.
425 (1927).
39 See note 21 supra.
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